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Abstract
Protection of individual privacy is a common concern when releasing and sharing data
and information. Differential privacy (DP) formalizes privacy in probabilistic terms
without making assumptions about the background knowledge of data intruders, and
thus provides a robust concept for privacy protection. Practical applications of DP in-
volve development of differentially private mechanisms to generate sanitized results at
a pre-specified privacy budget. In the sanitization of bounded statistics such as propor-
tions and correlation coefficients, the bounding constraints will need to be incorporated
in the differentially private mechanisms. There has been little work on examining the
consequences of the bounding constraints on the accuracy of sanitized results and the
statistical inferences of the population parameters based on the sanitized results. In
this paper, we formalize the differentially private truncated and boundary inflated
truncated (BIT) mechanisms for releasing statistics with bounding constraints. The
impacts of the truncated and BIT Laplace mechanisms on the statistical accuracy and
validity of sanitized statistics are evaluated both theoretically and empirically via sim-
ulation studies. We also provide an upper bound for the MSE between the sanitized
and original results for a given n and its convergence rate toward 0 in the truncated
and BIT Laplace mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
Protection of individual privacy is always a concern when releasing and sharing information.
A data release mechanism aims to provide useful information to the public without com-
promising individual privacy. Differential privacy (DP) is a concept developed in theoretical
computer science (Dwork et al., 2006b; Dwork, 2008, 2011) and has gained great popularity
in recent years in both theoretical research and practical applications. DP formalizes privacy
in mathematical terms without making assumptions about the background knowledge of data
intruders and thus provides a robust concept for privacy protection. Practical applications
of DP involve development of differentially private mechanisms, also referred to as sanitiz-
ers, through which original results are processed and converted to results that do not reveal
individual information at a pre-specified privacy budget. There are general differentially
private mechanisms such as the Laplace mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006b), the Exponential
mechanism (McSherry and Talwar, 2007; McSherry, 2009), and more recently, the staircase
mechanism (Geng et al., 2015), the generalized Gaussian mechanism (Liu, 2016), and the
adaptive mechanisms such as the multiplicative weighting mechanism (Hardt et al., 2012)
and the median mechanism (Roth and Roughgarden, 2010) for sanitizing multiple correlated
queries. There are also differentially private mechanisms targeting specifically at certain
statistical analyses such as robust and efficient point estimators (Dwork and Smith, 2010;
Dwork, 2011), principle component analysis (Chaudhuri et al., 2012), linear and penalized
regression (Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Kifer et al., 2012), Bayesian inferences of probabilistic
graphical models (Zhang et al., 2015), machine learning, data mining, and big data analytics
in genomics, healthcare, biometrics (Blum et al., 2008; Mohammed et al., 2011; Yu et al.,
2014; Lin et al., 2016; Sadhya and Singh, 2016), among others.
In the context of DP, it is often assumed that data and statistics (query results) are
bounded globally. The bounding assumption is supported from a technical perspective as well
as justified from a practical point of view. First, it is technically difficult to apply DP, at least
in some common differentially private mechanisms such as the Laplace mechanism, to perturb
unbounded statistics while ensuring some level of usefulness of the sanitized results. Second,
some statistics are naturally bounded per definition, such as proportions (bounded by [0, 1])
and correlation coefficients (bounded by [−1, 1]). Third, real-life data in general support the
assumption of bounded data, providing a practical basis for the applications of differentially
private sanitization algorithms that rely on data boundedness. Though numerical attributes
in statistical parametric modelling are often modelled via distributions with unbounded
domains (e.g., Gaussian or Poisson assumptions), those distributional assumptions are in
many cases only approximate and the probabilities of out-of-bounds values are often small
enough to be ignorable under these assumptions. For instance, it is safe to say human height
is bounded within (0, 300)cm. Though it is often modelled by Gaussian distributions with
support [−∞,∞], Pr(height < 0 cm or > 300 cm) ≈ 0 under the Gaussian assumption.
If all attributes in a data set are bounded, statistics from either descriptive or inferential
procedures based on the data set in general are also bounded. For example, if a numerical
attribute is bounded within [a, b], so is its sample mean, and its variance is bounded within
[0, n(b−a)2/(4(n−1))] for a given sample size n (Shiffler and Harsha, 1980). Finally, it should
be noted that the bounds in the context of DP are data-invariant and “global” bounds rather
than data-specific “local” bounds; this ensures the robustness of DP against the worst-case
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privacy attack without assuming what the attackers have and how good they are. In other
words, if the local bounds, which are functions of the data at hand, were to be used, then
the bounds themselves, if released as is, would leak information about the original data.
Some commonly used differentially private mechanisms including the Laplace and Gaus-
sian mechanisms release sanitized results from the real line (−∞,∞) and do not automat-
ically deal with the bounding constraint. Some practitioners choose to ignore the bounds
and release the raw sanitized results as is. We would not recommend this approach since
the out-of-bounds values carry no practical meaning and eventually will be discarded by
data users. Another approach is to formulate the problem as a constrained optimization
problem with inequality constraints in the general framework of constrained inference in DP.
The constrained inference approach concerns about finding a set of sanitized results that
are optimal estimators of the unconstrained sanitized results by some criteria, such as the
l2 distance, subject to a set of pre-defined and known constraints. Therefore, “inferences”
in this context is not the same as the classical statistical inferences, which is about infer-
ring population parameters via point and interval estimations and hypothesis testing given
finite sample data. The constrained inference can deal with both inequality and equality
constraints. For instance, proportions p = (p1, . . . , pK)
T are subject to both the equality
constraint
∑K
j=1 pj = 1 and the inequality constraint pj ∈ [0, 1] for j = 1, . . . , K. Barak
et al. (2007) employed linear programming (and the Fourier transformation) to obtain a
non-negative and consistent sanitized contingency tables. Hay et al. (2010) boosted the ac-
curacy of sanitized histograms (measured by the mean squared error between the sanitized
and original results) by incorporating the a priori rank constraint in unattributed histograms
and the equality constrained in universal histograms to increase the accuracy of lower-order
marginals. Qardaji et al. (2013) showed that combining the choice of a good branching factor
with constrained inference can further boost the accuracy of a sanitized histogram. Li et al.
(2015) investigated an extension to the matrix mechanism they proposed that incorporates
nonnegativity constraints when realizing count queries. While the constrained inference ap-
proach provides a general framework to deal with constraints in DP, all the above mentioned
work deals with count data. In addition, the approach can be analytically and computation-
ally demanding, depending on the statistics and the objective functions employed. We will
save the in-depth investigation of this approach as a future research topic.
In this paper, we focus on examining two methods that are straightforward and appeal to
practitioners for sanitizing statistics with bounding constraints. One approach, referred to
as the truncation procedure, throws the out-of-bounds sanitized values away and re-sanitizes
until a within-bound value is obtained. This procedure can also be realized by sampling
sanitized results directly from a truncated distribution associated the differentially private
mechanism. The other approach legitimizes the out-of-bounds sanitized results by setting
the out-of-bounds values at the boundaries, referred as the boundary inflated truncation/BIT
procedure. This procedure can also be realized by sampling sanitized results directly from
a piecewise distribution with probability mass at the boundaries. We assess their impact
on the statistical accuracy of sanitized results vs the original results both theoretically and
empirically in the context of the Laplace mechanism. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the fist work on the statistical properties of the BIT and truncation bounding procedures in
the context of DP.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the concepts of DP
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and some general differentially private mechanisms. Section 3 presents the the truncation
and BIT bounding procedures. Section 4 investigates the impact of the BIT and truncation
bounding procedures on the utility of sanitized results in terms of bias, mean squared error,
and consistency. Section 5 illustrates the applications of the BIT Laplace mechanisms and
examines the statistical properties of the sanitized results in two simulation studies. The
paper concludes in Section 6 with some final remarks and plans for future works.
2 Preliminaries
DP is defined as follows (Dwork, 2006; Dwork et al., 2006b): a sanitization/perturbation
algorithm R is -differentially private if for all data sets (x,x′) that is ∆(x,x′) = 1 and all
possible result subset Q to a query q,
∣∣∣log (Pr(R(q(x)))∈Q)Pr(R(q(x′))∈Q))∣∣∣ ≤ , where  > 0 is the privacy
budget parameter and ∆(x,x′) = 1 denotes that data x′ differs from x by only one individual
(there are two definitions on “differing by one”; see the online supplementary materials for
details). The original query result q(x) is sanitized via R and then released. Under DP,
the probabilities of obtaining the same query results from x and x′ after sanitization via R
are about the same – the ratio between which is bounded within (e−, e) – a neighborhood
around 1. DP guarantees individual privacy protection at a given  since the chance that
a participant in the data set will be identified based on the query result sanitized via R is
very low given that the query result is about the same with or without that individual in
the data set. DP provides a robust and powerful model against privacy attacks in the sense
that it does not make assumptions on the background knowledge or the behavior on data
intruders.  can be used as a tuning parameter – the smaller  is, the more protection there
is on the released data via R.
There also exist softer versions to the pure -DP that include the (, δ)-approximate
DP (aDP) (Dwork et al., 2006a), the (, δ)-probabilistic DP (pDP) (Machanavajjhala et al.,
2008), the (, δ) random DP (rDP) (Hall et al., 2012), and the (, τ)-concentrated DP (cDP)
(Dwork and Rothblum, 2016). In all the relaxed versions, one additional parameter is em-
ployed to characterize the amount of relaxation on top of the privacy budget . In (, δ)-aDP,
Pr(R(q(x)) ∈ Q) ≤ e Pr(R(q(x)) ∈ Q) + δ. A sanitization algorithm satisfies (, δ)-pDP if
the probability of generating an output belonging to the disclosure set is bounded below δ,
where the disclosure set contains all the possible outputs that leak information for a given
privacy tolerance . The (, δ)-rDP is also a probabilistic relaxation of DP; but it differs
from (, δ)-pDP in that the probabilistic relaxation is with respect to the generation of the
data while it is with respect to the sanitizer in the (, δ)-pDP. The (, τ)-cDP, similar to the
(, δ)-pDP, relaxes the satisfaction of DP with respect to the sanitizer, and ensures that the
expected privacy cost is  and (Prob(the actual cost > )> a) is bounded by e−(a/τ)
2/2.
The Laplace mechanism is a popular sanitizer to release statistics with -DP (Dwork
et al., 2006b). Liu (2016) introduces the generalized Gaussian (GG) mechanism (, δ)-pDP
that includes the Laplace mechanism as a special case (when p = 1 and δ = 0). Denote the
statistics of interest by sr×1. The Laplace and the GG mechanisms are based the lp global
sensitivity (GS), which is defined as δp = max
x,x′
∆(x,x′)=1
‖s(x) − s(x′)‖p = max
x,x′
∆(x,x′)=1
(
∑r
i=1 |si(x) −
si(x
′)|p)1/p for all pairs of data sets (x,x′) that are ∆(x,x′) = 1. δp is the maximum
difference in s in the lp distance between any pair of data sets x,x
′ with ∆(x,x′) = 1. The
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sensitivity is “global” since it is defined for all possible data sets and all possible ways of
two data sets differing by one record. The larger the GS is for s, the larger the disclosure
risk is from releasing the original s, and the more perturbation is needed for s to offset the
risk. Specifically, the Laplace mechanism of -DP sanitizes sr×1 as in s∗r×1 = s + e, where
e comprises r independent draws from Laplace distribution Lap(0, δ1
−1), where δ1 is the
l1-GS of s. For integer p ≥ 2, the GG mechanism of order p sanitizes s with (, δ)-pDP
by drawing sanitized s∗ from the GG distribution f(s∗)=
∏r
k=1
p
2bΓ(p−1) exp{(|s∗k − sk|/b)p} =∏r
k=1 GG(sk, b, p), where b satisfies Pr
(∑r
k=1 ak>b
p − δpp
)
< δ with ak =
∑p−1
j=1(
p
j)|s∗k −
sk|p−iδj1,k, δ1,k = the l1-GS of sk, and δp = the lp-GS of s. When p = 2, the GG mechanism
becomes the Gaussian mechanism of (, δ)-pDP that generates sanitized s∗k from N(sk, σ
2 =
b2
2
) for k = 1, . . . , r. The Laplace and GG mechanisms produce unbound sanitized results
from the real line (−∞,∞); therefore, some bounding procedures will be needed if the two
mechanisms are applied to sanitize bounded statistics.
The Exponential mechanism is another popular sanitizer of -DP (McSherry and Talwar,
2007). The mechanism is based on a utility function of all possible outputs to a query and
the sensitivity of the utility function. Denote by u(s∗|x) the utility score of output s∗ given
data x. S is the set containing all possible outputs s∗, and δu = max
x,x′,s∗∈S
∆(x,x′)=1
|u(s∗|x)− u(s∗|x′)|
is the maximum change in score u between two data sets x and x′ with ∆(x,x′) = 1. The
Exponential mechanism of -DP generates s∗ from distribution
exp
(
u(s∗|x) 
2δu
)
∑
s∗∈Sexp
(
u(s∗|x) 
2δu
) if S is discrete, and exp
(
u(s∗|x) 
2δu
)
∫
s∗∈Sexp
(
u(s∗|x) 
2δu
) if S is continuous. (1)
The Exponential mechanism can sanitize bounded statistics directly by sampling from the
distribution in Eq (1) with a predefined bounded domain S.
3 Truncated and BIT Laplace Mechanisms
In this section, we formalize two commonly used bounding procedures to set up the frame-
work for the examination of the statistical properties of sanitized outcomes from these pro-
cedures in Section 4. Both procedures are intuitive and straightforward to apply, and can
be coupled with any differentially private mechanisms. We focus on their applications in the
context of the Laplace mechanism given its popularity, and will look into their applications
in other mechanisms as the GG mechanism in the future.
Definition 1. Denote the bounded statistics by sr×1 = (s1, . . . , sr) ∈ [c10, c11]×· · ·×[cr0, cr1],
where [ci0, ci1] are the bounds for i
th element in s (i = 1, . . . , r), the privacy budget by , the
l1-GS of s by δ1. Let λ = δ1
−1.
(a) The truncated Laplace mechanism of -DP sanitizes s by drawing s∗ from the trun-
cated Laplace distribution
f(s∗)=
r∏
i=1
Lap(si, λ|ci0 ≤s∗≤ ci1)=
r∏
i=1
exp
(
− |s∗i−si|
λ
)
2λ
(
1− 1
2
exp(− ci1−si
λ
)− 1
2
exp( ci0−si
λ
)
) . (2)
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(b) The boundary-inflated-truncated (BIT) Laplace mechanism of -DP sanitizes s
by drawing s∗ from the BIT Laplace distribution f(s∗) =
∏r
i=1 f(s
∗
i ), where f(s
∗
i ) is
f(s∗i ) =

1
2
exp(−(si − ci0)/λ) if s∗i = ci0
Lap(si, λ) if ci0 < s
∗
i < ci1
1− 1
2
exp(−(ci1 − si)/λ) if s∗i = ci1
(3)
Rather than sampling directly from Eqn (2), the truncated Laplace mechanism can also be
realized via in a post-hoc manner by throwing away out-of-bounds sanitized results from the
regular Laplace mechanism until catching an in-bound value. Similarly, the BIT bounding
procedure can be realized by post-hoc setting out-of-bounds sanitized results from the regular
Laplace mechanism at the corresponding boundaries. If the scale parameter λ → ∞ in the
Laplace distribution when  → 0 or δ1 → ∞, it can be easily established that f(si) in the
truncated Laplace mechanism in Eq. (2) converges to an uniform distribution unif(c0i, c1i),
and that in the BIT Laplace distribution in Eq. (3) converges to a Bernoulli distribution with
probability mass at c0i and c1i, respectively. In both of the asymptotic cases, the sanitized
results preserve little original information.
The Laplace and BIT Laplace mechanisms, as in the regular Laplace mechanism, require
calculation of the l1-GS of targeted s for sanitization. GS in general needs to be determined
analytically though the value might not be tight; numerical computation of GS is not feasible
since it is impossible to enumerate all possible data x and all possible ways of ∆(x,x′) = 1
especially when x contains continuous attributes or when sample size n is large. We have
obtained the l1 GS of some common statistics, including proportions, means, variances, and
covariances (see the online supplementary materials). The GS values were calculated for
both definitions of two data sets differing by one record and the results turned out to be
the same between the two on most of the examined statistics (except for histograms, pooled
variances and covariances). In all calculations, we assume the sample size n is a known
constant and carries no privacy concern, which is often the case in statistical analysis except
for, for example, adaptive and group sequential designs, where the final n is a function of
data and also a random variable. It should be noted that the GS of a function of a statistic
s is not equal to the function of the GS of s in general. For example, δ1 of a sample variance
is (c1−c0)2n−1, but δ1 of the sample standard deviation (SD) cannot be simply calculated as√
(c1 − c0)2n−1. In fact, the GS of the SD is more difficult to calculate analytically compared
to that of the variance. When the GS of s is not easy to calculate, but a data-independent
function of s, say t = f(s), is, we can instead sanitize t to obtain t∗ and then obtain sanitized
s∗ via the back-transformation s∗ = f−1(t∗).
4 Statistical Properties of Sanitized s∗ under Bounding
Constraint
In Definition 1, the bounds [c10, c11]×· · · [cr0, cr1] are assumed to be data invariant and global
to guarantee -DP. On the other hand, ignoring the local properties of data x in a bounding
procedure could have a negative impact on the statistical properties of sanitized results s∗.
In this section, we investigate the statistical behaviors of s∗ produced by a sanitizer with
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bounding constraints. We start by defining the desired statistical properties of sanitized
s∗ (Definition 2), then examine the bias of s∗ sanitized by the truncated and BIT Laplace
mechanisms relative to the original s (Proposition 3), and finally present an upper bound
for the mean squared error for s∗ relative to s sanitized by the truncated and BIT Laplace
mechanisms and examine its the convergence rate to 0. In addition, we list in Proposition 5
a set of sufficient conditions for the sanitized s∗ to be asymptotically unbiased and consistent
for true parameter θ in the case where the original s is an estimator for θ.
Definition 2. (unbiasedness and consistency of sanitized statistic for original
statistic) Sanitized s∗ is unbiased for the original s if Es∗(s∗|s) = s; s∗ is asymptotically
unbiased for s if Es∗(s
∗|s) → s as n → ∞, where n is the sample size of original data x; s∗
is consistent for s if s∗
p−→ s as n→∞.
When s is boundless and sanitized by the regular Laplace mechanism, then s∗ is unbiased
for s since E(s∗) = s per the definition of the Laplace distribution. If δ1 ∝ n−k, where k > 0,
then s∗ is also consistent for s. When s is bounded and sanitized via the truncated or BIT
Laplace mechanisms, we will have biased s∗ unless the bounds are symmetric around the
original s. Proposition 3 presents the magnitude of the bias of s∗ in the truncated and BIT
Laplace mechanisms, and lists a sufficient condition for s∗ to achieve consistency for s. The
proof of Proposition 3 are provided in Appendix A.
Proposition 3. (bias of sanitized statistic from truncated and BIT Laplace mech-
anisms) Let [c0, c1] be the global bounds on a singular s, λ be the scale parameter, s be the
location parameter of the Laplace distribution, µ1 be the expected mean of the truncated
Laplace distribution f(s∗|s∗ ∈ [c0, c1]), and µ2 be the expected mean of the BIT Laplace
distribution defined in Eqn (3). Then
µ1 = s+
λ−c0+s
2
exp
(
c0−s
λ
)− λ+c1−s
2
exp
(
s−c1
λ
)
1− 1
2
exp( c0−s
λ
)− 1
2
exp( s−c1
λ
)
(4)
µ2 = s+
λ
2
[
exp
(
c0 − s
λ
)
− exp
(
s− c1
λ
)]
(5)
(a) µ1 = µ2 = s (s
∗ is unbiased for s) if and only if c0 + c1 = 2s (c0 and c1 are symmetric
around s).
(b) µ1µ2 > 0 (µ1 and µ2 are of the same sign) and |µ1 − s| ≤ |µ2 − s| (s∗ sanitized via the
BIT Laplace sanitizer is no more biased than that via the truncated Laplace sanitizer).
(c) s∗ sanitized via the truncated Laplace sanitizer or the BIT Laplace sanitizer is asymp-
totically unbiased and consistent for s as the scale parameter λ approaches 0.
For the global and data invariant bounds [c0, c1], it is unlikely the sanitized results would
be unbiased via the truncated or the BIT Laplace mechanism per part (a) of Proposition
3 as [c0, c1] are fixed while the original statistic s changes from data to data. To achieve
unbiasedness for s∗, local bounds that depend on specific data sets can be constructed at
additional privacy cost. For example, bounds [s−min(s− c0, c1− s), s+ min(s− c0, c1− s)],
which are symmetric around s, can be used to bound sanitize results in the truncated and
BIT Laplace mechanism that leads to unbiased s∗. However, since the bounds are functions
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of the original s, they will leak information about s, which has to be counted for in the
total privacy cost. On the other hand, the sanitized result, though likely biased, can still
enjoy nice asymptotic properties such as asymptotic unbiasedness and consistency as λ→ 0
per part (c) of Proposition 3. In the framework of the truncated Laplace and BIT Laplace
mechanisms, the scale parameter of the associated Laplace distribution λ is δ1
−1. For a pre-
specified , to satisfy the condition λ→ 0, then δ1 needs to be → 0. Intuitively speaking, as
n increases, the influence of a single individual on an aggregate measure of a data set is likely
to diminish, and the individual is less prone to be identified from releasing the aggregate
measure. Translated to the GS of the aggregate measure, it means that δ1 decreases with n.
δ1 of some commonly used statistics are ∝ n−1, such as proportions, means, variances and
covariances (online supplemental materials), and the sanitized copies of these statistics via
either the truncated or the BIT Laplace mechanisms are consistent for their original values
by part (c) of Proposition 3.
In practice, it is also important to bound the error of a sanitized statistic relative to its
original value. Proposition 4 examines the upper bound for the mean squared error (MSE)
for a sanitized statistic via the truncated and BIT Laplace mechanisms and the convergence
rate of the MSE to 0.
Proposition 4. (upper bound on mean squared error and convergence rate) Let s
be the location parameter, λ be the scale parameter of the Laplace distribution, and s∗ be
the sanitized result for s via the truncated Laplace or the BIT Laplace mechanisms. The
MSE Es∗(s
∗ − s)2 is upper bounded by 2λ2 = 2(δs/)2. If δs ∝ n−k, where k > 0 and n is
the sample size, then s∗ is MSE-consistent for s and the rate of the MSE converging to 0 is
O(n−2k) for a given .
The proof is provided in Appendix B. Example of λ ∝ n−k include the sample mean and
the sample proportion (where k = 1), among others. The results in Proposition 4 imply
that the MSE of a sanitized statistic from the truncated and the BIT Laplace mechanism
is comparable to the MSE from the regular Laplace mechanism without bounding, which
is also 2λ2. In other words, the bounding does not seem to affect the MSE of a sanitized
statistic despite the loss of unbiasedness in general.
Propositions 3 and 4 examines the statistical properties of the sanitized s∗ relative to
the original s. In many statistical analysis, the ultimate goal is to infer unknown population
parameters θ based on the sample data. Suppose s is an estimator for parameter θ in a
statistical model. Proposition 5 lists the sufficient conditions for s∗, the sanitized version of
s, to be asymptotically unbiased and consistent for θ.
Proposition 5. (asymptotic unbiasedness and consistency of sanitized statistic for
population parameter) .
(a) If E(s|θ) = θ or E(s|θ) → θ, and if Es∗(s∗|s) → s as n → ∞, then s∗ is asymptotically
unbiased for θ; that is, E(s∗|θ)→ θ.
(b) If s∗
p−→ s and s p−→ θ as n→∞, then s∗ is consistent for θ; that is, s∗ p−→ θ.
The proof of Proposition 5 is given in Appendix C. Note that Proposition 5 does not list the
conditions for obtaining an unbiasedness s∗ for θ as it is meaningless given the low likelihood
of obtaining an unbiased s∗ for s per Proposition 3. Proposition 5 implies that asymptotic
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unbiasedness and consistency of the sanitized s∗ for θ can be achieved in two steps. In step
one, we will choose an estimator s that is asymptotically unbiased or consistent for θ, which
should be relatively straightforward given that these types of estimators are well studied and
widely applied in statistics; in the second step, we will employ an appropriate differentially
private mechanism to generate s∗ that is asymptotically unbiased or consistent for s, such as
the BIT and the truncated Laplace mechanisms, which yield MSE-consistent s∗ for s under
the conditions listed in Propositions 4.
5 Simulation Studies
We conducted two simulation studies to demonstrate the applications of the truncated and
BIT bounding mechanisms and examine the statistical properties of the sanitized results. In
the first simulation, we sanitized a variance-covariance matrix, and focused on the compar-
isons between the sanitized results and the original results and between the truncated and
BIT truncated Laplace mechanisms on the effects on the sanitized results. In the second
simulation, we sanitized proportions and focused on the inferential properties of the san-
itized proportions by examining the bias, root mean squared error (RMSE) and coverage
probability (CP) for the true proportions based on the sanitized results.
5.1 simulation study 1
In this simulation, we applied the truncated and BIT Laplace mechanisms to sanitize a
variance-covariance matrix S in a data set of size n. The variance-covariance matrix is a
widely used statistic for examining the dependency structure among multiple continuous
variables. It is also an ideal statistic to examine the effects of the two mechanisms given
that every element in the matrix has to satisfy some type of bounding constraints. The
bounding constraints of a covariance matrix of any dimension include that the marginal
variances are positive and the correlations are bounded between [-1, 1]. Additionally, the
marginal variances are right-bounded in bounded data from which S is calculated. Table 1
summarizes the bounds and global sensitivity of the components in S.
Table 1: Global sensitivity of variance and covariance terms in a covariance matrix
statistic bounds‡ δ1
variance Sjj (0, n(cj1 − cj0)2/(4(n− 1))] (cj1 − cj0)2/n
variance Sj′j′ (0, n(cj′1 − cj′0)2/(4(n− 1))] (cj′1 − cj′0)2/n
covariance Sjj′ (−
√
SjjSj′j′ ,
√
SjjSj′j′) (cj1 − cj0)(cj′1 − cj′0)/n
‡[cj0, cj1]× [cj′0, cj′1] were the bounds of variables Xj and Xj′
When sanitizing S in general, we first obtain legitimate sanitized S∗jj and S
∗
j′j′ , and then
sanitize Sjj′ given S
∗
jj and S
∗
j′j′ under the constraint that S
∗
jj′ ∈ [−
√
S∗jjS
∗
j′j′ ,
√
S∗jjS
∗
j′j′ ].
Though the bounds for S∗jj′ depend on S
∗
jj and S
∗
j′j′ , the latter two are already sanitized;
therefore, bounding procedures for S∗jj′ using information S
∗
jj and S
∗
j′j′ does not incur ad-
ditional privacy cost. It is possible that the sanitized covariance matrix S∗ is not positive
definite (PD) with the element-wise sanitization approach. If a sanitized covariance matrix
is not PD and has a significant number of (small) negative eigenvalues, it can be made
PD with semidefinite optimization via, e.g., the alternating projections algorithm (Higham,
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2002), the Newton methods for nearest correlation matrix (Qi and Sun, 2006; Borsdorf and
Higham, 2010), and the spectral projected gradient method (Qi and Sun, 2006; Borsdorf
et al., 2010)1. A possible alternative is to sanitize S as a whole instead of element-wise, an
interesting and worthwhile topic for future research.
We examined in this simulation study a 2 × 2 variance-covariance matrix with three
different specifications of (S11, S22, r): (1, 2, 0), (1, 2,−0.4), and (1, 2, 0.7), respectively. The 3
correlation settings allow us to examine the bounding effects on the pairwise correlation when
there is no correlation, moderate (negative) correlation, and strong (positive) correlation.
We set the global bounds [c10, c11] at [−3, 3] and [c20, c21] at [−4.5, 4.5] 2. The total privacy
budget was  = 1. Since the 3 statistics were calculated on the same set of data, the
sequential composition principle applied (McSherry, 2009) when it comes to privacy budget
accouting. There are different ways to allocate the total budget when sanitizing multiple
statistics calculated from the same data set, such as by an equal allocation across all the
statistics or according to some type statistical or practical “importance” of the statistics (see
Liu (2017) for more discussion). Here we divided the total privacy budget  equally among the
3 statistics; that is, each sanitization received 1/3 of the total budget. We also investigated
a wide range of sample size n from 50 to 800. In each examined scenarios of (S, n), 500
independent sanitizations were carried out to examine the distributional properties of the
sanitized results.
The results are presented in Figure 1. In each plot, the average and the (2.5%, 25%,
75% and 97.5%) percentiles of the sanitized results from the 500 sanitizations are presented,
benchmarked against the original results. The main findings are summarized as follows.
First, when n was relatively small, there was noticeable bias in the sanitized results compared
to the original results, except for S12 and r when r = 0 (the boundaries were symmetric about
the original results and thus there was no bias per part (a) of Proposition 3). Second, the
sanitized results generated via the truncated Laplace mechanism were more biased than
those via the BIT Laplace mechanism, consistent with part (b) of Proposition 3. Third, as
n increased, both the bias and dispersion of the sanitized results approached 0, consistent
with part (c) of Proposition 3. Lastly, when n was small, the scale parameter associated
with the Laplace distribution in both mechanisms was large, therefore more sanitized values
were set at the boundary values in the BIT mechanism and the distribution of the sanitized
values became flatter in the truncated mechanism, especially for r.
5.2 simulation study 2
In this simulation, we aimed to release a proportion vector p where
∑K
j=1 pj = 1. Proportions
are very common statistics in public data release. For example, p could be the proportions of
different income levels in the US population, or the cell proportions from a cross-tabulation
of, say gender and race. Besides the bounding constraint [0, 1] on each proportion component,
p is also subject to the equality constraint
∑
j=1 pj = 1, which has to be retained in the
released sanitized results, making it an interesting problem to study.
1The R function nearPD() in package Matrix implements the alternating projections algorithm.
2For approximately Gaussian variables with means 0, both the bounds of [−3, 3] with a SD of 1 and
[−4.5, 4.5] with a SD of √2 represent > 99% data mass though this simulation did not require the Gaussian
assumption.
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Figure 1: Sanitized components in S ((Q1, Q2)% represents the Q1 and Q2 percentiles of the distribution of the sanitized statistic)
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Since the proportions are calculated from disjoint subsets of data, the addition or re-
moval of a single observation affects the count in exactly one cell, the GS (δ1) of releasing
p is n−1 or 2n−1, depending on which definition of “differing by one record” is used on
∆(x, x′) = 1 (see the online supplementary materials). With the Laplace mechanism, san-
itization of each proportion in p is perturbed with a noise term from Lap(δ1
−1). In this
simulation, we used δ1 = n
−1, and examined 3 different specifications of  (0.1, 0.5, 1) and
a range of sample size (n = 50 ∼ 500) (the results obtained from this simulation are also
applicable to δ1 = 2n
−1 with doubled ). 500 multinomial data sets, each sized at n, were
simulated from multinomial(n,p). We examined a 4-element p in this simulation and set
p = (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4) (these parameter values were chosen because they expand a wide
range – some are closer to the boundaries while others are closer to the center, allowing us
to examine the effects of the binding mechanisms on proportions of different magnitude).
The sample proportions pˆ were calculated in each repeat and were sanitized via the
truncated and BIT Laplace mechanisms respectively. We employed 3 procedures to ensure
the equality constraint
∑4
k=1 pk = 1 was met (in addition to the bounding constrained on
each proportion). In the first approach (rescaling and normalization), each proportion in pˆk
was sanitized independently to obtain the perturb version qˆ∗k, which was then normalized to
obtain pˆ∗k = qˆ
∗
k(
∑4
k=1 qˆ
∗
k)
−1; it is pˆ∗ that was released. This rescaling approach was intuitive
and straightforward. In the second approach, referred to as the all-but-one approach, we
sanitized 3 proportions out of 4, and then calculated the 4-th proportion via 1−∑3k=1 qˆ∗k. The
all-but-one approach obeyed the equality constraint during the sanitization without post-
processing as in the rescaling approach. In the third approach, referred to as the universal
histogram/UH approach, we applied a slightly modified procedure from Hay et al. (2010) to
ensure the equality constraint in p. In the original UH procedure in Hay et al. (2010), the
root node is sanitized and there is no inequality constraint; in our case, the root node was
fixed it at 1 as it was the summation of p, and there were inequality constraints. Since the
UH requires the number of children per node to be constant across the whole tree and there
needs to be at least three layers in the tree (since the root node is fixed at one in our case) in
order to show any level of improvement in the accuracy of some of the sanitized nodes, the
four proportions in p, represented by four leaf nodes, are thus combined in a binary fashion
in 3 layers; otherwise, it would be the same as the rescaling approach.
1. Arrange the 4 proportions in a 3-layer binary tree structure. The root node in the tree
always has a value of 1, and its two child nodes h1 and h2 in layer 2 satisfy the constraint
h1 + h2 = 1 (equality constraint 1). Similarly, the two child nodes of h1 (h11 and h12 in
layer 3) satisfy h11 + h12 = h1 (equality constraint 2) and the two child nodes of h2 (h21
and h22 in layer 3) satisfy h21 +h22 = h2 (equality constraint 3). As a result, the four leaf
nodes in layer 3, corresponding to the 4 proportions in p, satisfy h11 +h12 +h21 +h22 = 1.
2. Sanitize h1 and h2 in layer 2, and (h11, h12, h21, h22) in layer 3 via the BIT and Laplace
Laplace mechanism with the scale parameter 2/(n). The GS doubles in this procedures
since there are two sets of proportions to be sanitized on the same set of data.
3. Calculate the inconsistency z among the nodes in the tree due to sanitization. Let h∗(v)=
{h∗1, h∗2, h∗11, h∗12, h∗21, h∗22} denote the sanitized results from step 2, then z(v) = h∗(v) if v
is a leaf node in layer 3, and z(v) = 1
3
∑
v′∈children of v z(v
′) + 2
3
h∗(v) for v in layer 2.
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4. Correct the inconsistency in the tree. For nodes in layers 2 and 3, the corrected nodes
h¯(v)=z(v)+1
2
(h(u)−∑v′z(v′)), where u is the parent of v, and h¯(v)=1 for the root node3.
5. Release h¯(v).
Hay et al. (2010) stated that the UH procedure optimizes the accuracy of the sanitized
nodes closer to the root (low-order marginals) with the smallest MSE (relative to the original
results) among the approaches that yield unbiased sanitized estimators for the original results
while satisfying the equality/consistency constraint. However, the UH procedure decreases
the accuracy of the sanitized high-order nodes and the leaf nodes. This implies the accuracy
of the 4 individual proportions in p, which were the leaf nodes in the simulation, will suffer,
but some linear combinations of p, say p1 + p2 might have higher accuracy than from the
rescaling and the all-but-one approaches. In addition, the UH procedure can be sensitive to
the order of how the tree is built. We tried two different ways of grouping the 4 proportions
into two nodes (h1 and h2) in the second layer. One way ((h11 = p1 = 0.1, h12 = p2 = 0.2) ∈
h1; (h21 = p3 = 0.3, h22 = p4 = 0.4) ∈ h2) seemed slightly better in preserving the original
information than the other ((h11 = p1, h12 = p4) ∈ h1; (h21 = p2, h22 = p3) ∈ h2); therefore,
we only present the results from the former.
We calculated the bias and RMSE relative to the true p, and the coverage probability
(CP) of the 95% confidence interval for the true p based on the sanitized pˆ∗ in each of the
3 approaches. The bias, RMSE, and CP based on the sanitized results were compared to
those based on the original p. As discussed above, some of the lower-order nodes (such as
h1 and h2) might have improved accuracy in the UH approach, we thus also compared the
inferences of p1 + p2, p2 + p3 and p2 + p4 between the rescaling and the UH approach. There
is no need to examine the sum of 3 proportions, say p1 + p2 + p3, as its accuracy would be
the same as the individual proportion p4 under the equality constraint.
In the rescaling approach, there was minimal bias in sanitized pˆ∗ when  = 1 and  = 0.5
across all n and both bounding mechanisms (truncation or BIT); and there was some bias
at small n when  = 0.1, especially for the smallest proportion p1 = 0.1 (positive bias) and
the largest proportion p4 = 0.4 (negative bias). Consistent with Proposition 3, the BIT
mechanism yielded less bias than the truncated mechanism. The RMSE of the sanitized
results was inflated compared to the original RMSE, which was expected given the noise
injected during the sanitization step. The larger  or the larger n was, the smaller the
inflation was. When  = 1, the sanitized and the original RMSEs were basically the same.
Though the BIT mechanism led to smaller bias compared to the truncated mechanism for
small n when  = 0.1, the RMSE values were larger in the former. Finally, the CP was
around 95% at all n when  = 1, decreased to 85% ∼ 92% for n ∈ [50, 300] when  = 0.5,
and down to 50% ∼ 80% for all n ∈ [50, 500] when  = 0.1. The BIT mechanism had worse
undercoverage than the truncated mechanism at small n for  = 0.1 and yielded similar CP
as the truncated mechanism in other cases.
3Even if the BIT or the truncated Laplace mechanisms is employed in Step 2, negative nodes might
re-appear after the correction in Step 4. If that occurs, the negative nodes are set at 0 and the nodes that
share the same parent node with the negative nodes are re-normalized to sum up to their parent node. We
also tried applying the regular Laplace mechanism directly in Step 2 and used the BIT or truncated Laplace
mechanisms to bound the nodes after Step 4, and the results were similar or slightly worse compared to the
above procedure, depending on which statistics to release.
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The undercoverage observed can be resolved to some degree by using the multiple syn-
thesis (MS) technique in DP (Liu, 2017; Bowen and Liu, 2016). The MS takes into the
variability introduced by the sanitization process by releasing multiple synthetic sets. In
this case, we independently sanitized 5 sets in each simulation scenario; and the inferences
were then combined over the 5 sets using the rule given in Liu (2017). In order to maintain
-DP overall, each set was sanitized using 1/5 of the total privacy budget  per the sequen-
tial composition theorem. The results are given in Figure 3. The CP improved significantly
from releasing multiple synthetic data sets, especially for the BIT mechanism. However, due
to the decreased privacy budget per synthetic set and the bounding, the sanitized results
were noisier and the biases were noticeably larger, even after being averaged the 5 sets. For
example, there was noticeable bias at  = 0.1 and the RMSE did not approach the original
RMSE within the examined range of n for both mechanisms.
Compared to the rescaling approach, 1) the all-but-one approach (Fig 4) had similar
performance in bias and RMSE for  = 0.5 and 1; 2) when  = 0.1, the bias was smaller at
small n but the RMSE was noticeably large in the all-but-one approach;3) the performance on
CP was similar in all proportions but was much worse for p1 = 0.1, which was the proportion
calculated from the other 3. Compared to the rescaling approach, the UH approach (Fig 5)
was worse in bias, RMSE and CP for all proportions at all  values when n was relatively
small; the under-performance was the most obvious when  = 0.1. The inferiority of the UH
relative to the rescaling approach are expected as the UH benefits the accuracy of the low-
order marginals (the nodes closer the root) but the leaf nodes (the individual proportions
in p) actually suffer a loss of accuracy. Figures S1 and S2 in the online supplementary
materials display how much improvement the UH approach brought to the pairwise sums
in p compared to the rescaling approach. The sanitized inferences on p1 + p2 (node h1)
were better than p2 + p3 and p2 + p4 (sum of two leaf nodes from different parents) in
the UH approach. However, compared to the rescaling approach, the accuracy of sanitized
inferences on p1 +p2 did not appear to be better; and those on p2 +p3 and p2 +p4 were worse.
In summary, the UH approach was not efficient as the rescaling approach in preserving the
original information in the individual proportions in p, and the supposed improvement in the
low-level nodes (p1 +p2) was not obvious in this case either, perhaps due to 1) the additional
inequality constraint, which is not considered in Hay et al. (2010), on top of the equality
constraint; and 2) the number of layers and nodes was not large enough to demonstrate the
advantages of the UH approach.
6 Discussion
We defined two differentially private mechanisms for sanitizing statistics with bounding con-
straints and examined the statistical properties of sanitized results from the two mechanisms.
Both the truncated and BIT Laplace mechanisms produce biased sanitized results relative to
their original observed values unless the bounds are symmetric around the original results,
which is a hard-to-satisfy condition in real life given than the original statistics change by
data while the bounds are global and fixed. However, sanitized results can still be MSE-
consistent for the original values if the scale parameter of the Laplace distribution associated
with the two mechanisms approaches 0 as the sample size n approaches∞. We also provided
an upper bound for the MSE between the sanitized results relative the original for a definite
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Figure 2: Bias, RMSE and CP of sanitized proportions (the rescaling approach was applied to satisfy the equality constraint; red lines
represent the 4 original proportions, and blue lines represent the 4 sanitized proportions)
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Figure 3: Bias, RMSE and CP of sanitized proportions from multiple synthesis (the rescaling approach was applied to satisfy the equality
constraint; red lines represent the 4 original proportions, and blue lines represent the 4 sanitized proportions)
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Figure 4: Bias, RMSE and CP of sanitized proportions in the all-but-one approach (red lines represent the 4 original proportions, and
blue lines represent the 4 sanitized proportions)
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Figure 5: Bias, RMSE and CP of sanitized proportions in a modified universal histogram procedure based on Hay et. al. (2010) (red
lines represent the 4 original proportions, and blue lines represent the 4 sanitized proportions)
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n in the truncated and BIT Laplace mechanisms.
Though the BIT Laplace mechanism in theory delivers less biased sanitized statistics than
the truncated Laplace mechanism, the former does not seem to be more advantageous over
the latter in practical applications for the following reasons. First, asymptotic unbiasedness
and consistency hold in both mechanisms, so there is minimal difference between the two
when n is large. Second, the truncated Laplace distribution is a smooth distribution while the
BIT Laplace distribution is piecewise. Though the distributional shape might be irrelevant
in the release of a single sanitized statistic, it will when it comes to uncertainty quantification
or making inferences about population parameters based on the sanitized data. Last, the
3-piece distributional shape of the BIT Laplace distribution requires the intervals of the
outcomes to be closed on both ends so that the boundary values are exclusively defined.
This is not necessary for the truncated Laplace distribution where the density function is
continuous and smooth. This last point seems trivial but can be irritating in practical
applications. For example, in the first simulation, closed intervals [0, (c1 − c0)2n/(4(n− 1))]
and [−1, 1] were applied to variance and correlation, respectively. As a result, some sanitized
outputs were exactly 0 for variance, and exactly -1 or 1 for correlation from the BIT Laplace
mechanism. In practice, these values are rare occurrences due to measurement errors and
noises, and the user may choose to reject the sanitized results that are valued exactly at the
boundary. If the user demands more plausible results that agree with real-life situations,
what values to replace the implausible boundary values becomes an arbitrary decision and
could potentially affect the statistical properties of the sanitize results. Those concerns do
not exist in the truncated Laplace mechanism.
This paper has focused on the applications of the truncated and BIT procedures in the
framework of the Laplace mechanism of -DP. The two procedures are general enough to be
extended to other differentially private sanitizers that the output from which spans the real
line, and to the soft versions of DP. The statistical properties of sanitized results from these
extended applications will have to be examined case by case.
As briefly mentioned in the Introduction section, releasing differentially private statistics
with the bounding constrains falls can be dealt with the constrained inferences approach by
minimizing the loss function measuring the deviance between constrained and unconstrained
sanitized results while satisfying a defined set of constraints. The simulation study imple-
mented 3 approaches for satisfying the equality constraints, with one of them developed in
the framework of the constrained inference, among a set of proportions that were also subject
to bounding constraints. The simulation exercise only represents a small empirical attempt
in handling constraints when releasing sanitized statistics; further research is warranted on
the development of innovative and efficient approaches that release the optimal sanitized
results under both inequality and equality constraints.
Supplementary Materials
The online supplementary materials contain the calculations of the l1 GS of some com-
mon statistics, including the sample proportion, mean, variance, and covariance; as well
as additional results from Simulation Study 2. The materials are available at https:
//www3.nd.edu/~fliu2/bounding-suppl.pdf..
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 3
The mean of a truncated Laplace distribution Lap(s, λ|x ∈ [c0, c1] is µ1 = E(x|x ∈ (c0, c1)) =
(F (c1)− F (c0))−1
∫ c1
c0
x
2λ
exp
(
− |x−s|
λ
)
dx =
∫ s
c0
x
2λ
exp
(
x−s
λ
)
dx+
∫ c1
s
x
2λ
exp
(
s−x
λ
)
dx
= (F (c1)− F (c0))−1
(
s+ 1
2
(
(λ− c0) exp
(
c0−s
λ
)−(c1 + λ) exp(s−c1λ )))
= (1− 1
2
exp( s−c1
λ
)− 1
2
exp( c0−s
λ
))−1
(
s+ 1
2
(
(λ− c0) exp
(
c0−s
λ
)−(c1 + λ) exp(s−c1λ )))
= s+
(
1− 1
2
exp( s−c1
λ
)− 1
2
exp( c0−s
λ
)
)−1(1
2
(λ− c0 + s) exp
(
c0−s
λ
)− 1
2
(c1 + λ− s) exp
(
s−c1
λ
))
.
The mean of the BIT Laplace distribution is µ2 = p0c0 + p1c1 + (1− p0− p1)E(x|x ∈ [c0, c1]).
Since p0 = Pr(x < c0) =
1
2
exp( c0−s
λ
) and p1 = Pr(x > c1) =
1
2
exp( s−c1
λ
), and given the result
from Part a), then µ2 is
c0
2
exp
(
c0−s
λ
)
+ c1
2
exp
(
s−c1
λ
)
+ s + λ−c0
2
exp
(
c0−s
λ
)− c1+λ
2
exp
(
s−c1
λ
)
=
s+ λ
2
[
exp
(
c0−s
λ
)− exp(s−c1
λ
)]
.
Part a): In the case of µ1, s
∗ is unbiased for s if (λ−c0 +s) exp
(
c0−s
λ
)
= (c1 +λ−s) exp
(
s−c1
λ
)
.
Let f(x) = (λ + |x|) exp(− |x|
λ
), where x is a real number. f(x) is symmetric about x = 0.
f ′(x) = − |x|
λ
exp(− |x|
λ
); therefore, f(x) is a monotonic increasing function when x < 0 and
a monotonic decreasing function when x > 0. Taken together, (λ − c0 + s) exp
(
c0−s
λ
)
=
(c1 + λ − s) exp
(
s−c1
λ
)
and s∗ is unbiased for s iff c0 and c1 are symmetric about s. In the
case of µ2, s
∗ is unbiased for s if exp
(
c0−s
λ
)
= exp
(
s−c1
λ
)
. f(x) is symmetric about x = 0 Let
f(x) = exp(− |x|
λ
), where x is a real number. f ′(x) = −sign(x) exp(− |x|
λ
); therefore, f(x) is a
monotonic increasing function when x < 0 and a monotonic decreasing function when x > 0.
Taken together, exp
(
c0−s
λ
)
= exp
(
s−c1
λ
)
and s∗ is unbiased for s iff c0 and c1 are symmetric
about s.
Part b): When s − c0 < c1 − s (both > 0). Since exp
(
c0−s
λ
) ≥ exp(s−c1
λ
)
, then µ2 > s. In
the case of µ1, we have shown in Part a) that f(x) = (|x| + λ) exp(−|x|/λ) is symmetric
and monotonically decreasing with |x|; therefore, f(s − c0) > f(c1 − s) and the numerator
in Eq. (4) is > 0. Since exp( s−c1
λ
) < 1 and exp( c0−s
λ
) < 1, the denominator in Eq. (4) > 0.
Taken together, µ1 > s. When s− c0 > c1 − s, we can prove µ2 < s and µ1 > s in a similar
manner as when s− c0 < c1− s. To compare the magnitude of the µ1 vs µ2, we compare the
magnitude of bias:
s−c0+λ
2 exp
(
c0−s
λ
)− c1−s+λ2 exp (s−c1λ )
1− 12 exp( s−c1λ )− 12 exp( c0−sλ )
v.s.
λ
2
[
exp
(
c0 − s
λ
)
− exp
(
s− c1
λ
)]
(s− c0) exp
(
c0−s
λ
)−(c1 − s) exp (s−c1λ )+ λ2 [exp(c0−sλ )−exp(s−c1λ )][exp( s−c1λ ) + exp( c0−sλ )]
1− 12 exp( s−c1λ )− 12 exp( c0−sλ )
v.s. 0
(s− c0) exp
(
c0−s
λ
)−(c1 − s) exp (s−c1λ )+ λ2 [exp(2 c0−sλ )−exp(2 s−c1λ )]
1− 12 exp( s−c1λ )− 12 exp( c0−sλ )
v.s. 0 since denominator>0
or (s− c0) exp
(
c0 − s
λ
)
+
λ
2
exp
(
2
c0 − s
λ
)
−
(
(c1 − s) exp
(
s− c1
λ
)
+
λ
2
exp
(
2
s− c1
λ
))
v.s. 0.
Let f(x) = xe−x/λ + λe−2x/λ/2 and x > 0, then the last equation above is to compare f(s− c0)−
f(c1− s) v.s. 0. The first derivative f ′(x) = −e−2x/λ+ e−x/λ−xe−x/λ/λ = e−x/λ(1−x/λ− e−x/λ).
The sign of f ′(x) is determined by the second term g(x) = 1 − x/λ − e−x/λ since the first term
e−x/λ > 0. g′(x) = λ(e−x/λ−1). Since x > 0, then g′(x) < 0, implying g(x) decreases monotonically
20
with increasing x, and reaches the maximum as x → 0. Since g(0) = 0, so g(x) < 0 for x > 0.
Taken together, f ′(x) = e−x/bg(x) < 0. Therefore, f(x) decreases monotonically with increasing x.
When s − c0 < c1 − s, f(s − c0) > f(c1 − s) > 0 or µ1 − s > µ2 − s > 0; when s − c0 > c1 − s,
f(s− c0) < f(c1 − s) < 0 or µ1 − s < µ2 − s < 0. In summary, |µ1 − s| > |µ2 − s|.
Part c): To show the consistency of s∗ for s, we apply the Chebyshev’s inequality by showing
E(s∗ − s)2 → 0 or E(s∗2) − (E(s∗))2 → 0 as n → ∞. In the truncated Laplace mechanism, Let
s∗ denote a random draw from the truncated Laplace distribution with location parameter s and
scale parameter λ and bounds [c0, c1], where c0 ≤ s ≤ c1.
E(s∗2) = (F (c1)− F (c0))−1
∫ c1
c0
s∗2
2λ exp
(
− |s∗−s|λ
)
ds∗
=(F (c1)− F (c0))−1
(∫ s
c0
s∗2
2λ
exp
(
s∗ − s
λ
)
ds∗ +
∫ c1
s
s∗2
2λ
exp
(
s− s∗
λ
)
ds∗
)
=(F (c1)−F (c0))−1
(
2λ2+s2− 12(2λ2−2λc0 + c20) exp
(
c0−s
λ
)− 12(2λ2+2λc1 + c21) exp( s−c1λ )) (A.1)
where F (c1)−F (c0) = 1− 12 exp( s−c1λ )− 12 exp( c0−sλ ). Eq (A.1) suggests E(s∗2)→ s2 as λ→ 0. Since
E(s∗)→ s (Eq (4)), thus (E(s∗))2 → s2 as λ→ 0. Taken together, as λ→ 0, E(s∗2)−(E(s∗))2 → 0.
Since λ ∝ nk, where k < 0, then as n → ∞, s∗ p−→ s, or s∗ is consistent for s. In the BIT Laplace
mechanism, E((s∗2) = p0c20 +p1c21 +(1−p0−p1)E(s∗2|s∗ ∈ [c0, c1]), where p0 = F (c0) = 12 exp( c0−sλ )
and p1 = 1 − F (c1) = 12 exp( s−c1λ ), and E(s∗2|s∗ ∈ [c0, c1]) is given Eq (A.1). Therefore, E(s∗2) =
c20
2 exp
(
c0−s
λ
)
+
c21
2 exp
(
s−c1
λ
)
+2λ2+s2− 12(2λ2−2λc0+c20) exp
(
c0−s
λ
)− 12(2λ2+2λc1+c21) exp ( s−c1λ ) =
2λ2 + s2 − (λ2−λc0) exp
(
c0−s
λ
)− (λ2 + λc1) exp ( s−c1λ ), which→s2 as λ→0. Since E(s∗)→s (Eq
5), thus (E(s∗))2 → s2 as λ→ 0. Taken together, as λ→ 0, E(s∗2)− (E(s∗))2 → 0. Since λ ∝ nk,
where k < 0, then as n→∞, s∗ p−→ s, or s∗ is consistent for s.
B Proof of Proposition 4
MSE = E(s∗ − s)2 = V(s∗) + bias(s∗)2 = E(s∗2)− (E(s∗))2 + bias2.
In the Laplace truncated mechanism, let A= λ−c0+s2 exp
(
c0−s
λ
)−λ+c1−s2 exp (s−c1λ ) ; p1 = 12 exp( c0−sλ );
and p2 =
1
2 exp(
s−c1
λ ), and B = 2λ
2+s2−12(2λ2−2λc0 + c20) exp
(
c0−s
λ
)− 12(2λ2+2λc1 + c21) exp( s−c1λ );
thus bias2 =
(
A
1− p1 − p2
)2
; (E(s∗))2 =
(
s+
A
1− p1 − p2
)2
; E(s∗2) =
B
1− p1 − p2
MSE =
B
1− p1 − p2 −
(
s+
A
1− p1 − p2
)2
+
(
A
1− p1 − p2
)2
=
B − 2sA
1− p1 − p2 − s
2; where B − 2sA =
2λ2+s2− 12(2λ2−2λc0 + c20)p1 − 12(2λ2+2λc1 + c21)p2 − s(λ− c0 + s)p1 + s(λ+ c1 − s)p2
=− s2 + 2(s2 + λ2)(1− p1 − p2)− (−λc0 + c20/2 + s(λ− c0))p1 − (λc1 + c21/2− s(λ+ c1))p2
Therefore, MSE
=s2 + 2λ2 − s
2 + (−λc0 + c
2
0
2 + s(λ− c0))p1 + (λc1 +
c21
2 − s(λ+ c1))p2
1− p1 − p2
=s2 + 2λ2 − s
2 +λ(s− c0)p1 + ( c
2
0
2 − sc0)p1 +λ(c1 − s)p2 + (
c21
2 − sc1)p2
1− p1 − p2
21
=s2 + 2λ2 −λ [(s− c0)p1 +(c1 − s)p2]+[(
c20
2 − sc0)p1 + (
c21
2 − sc1)p2] + s2
1− p1 − p2
=2λ2 −λ[(s−c0)p1 +(c1−s)p2] + [(
c20
2 − sc0)p1 + (
c21
2 − sc1)p2] + s2(p1 + p2)
1− p1 − p2
=2λ2 −λ [(s− c0)p1 +(c1 − s)p2] + [(
c20
2 − sc0 + s2)p1 + (
c21
2 − sc1 + s2)p2]
1− p1 − p2
=2λ2−
λ
2
[
(s− c0) exp( c0−sλ ) + (c1 − s) exp( s−c1λ )
]
1− 12 exp( c0−sλ )− 12 exp( s−c1λ )
+
1
2 [(
c20
2 − sc0 + s2) exp( c0−sλ ) + (
c21
2 − sc1 + s2) exp( s−c1λ )]
1− 12 exp( c0−sλ )− 12 exp( s−c1λ )
=2λ2−
λ
2
[
(s−c0) exp( c0−sλ ) +(c1 − s) exp( s−c1λ )
]
+ 12[(
c20
4 +(
c0
2 − s)2) exp( c0−sλ )+(
c21
4 +(
c1
2 −s)2) exp( s−c1λ )]
1− 12 exp( c0−sλ )− 12 exp( s−c1λ )
<2λ2 because each term in the boxed expression is < 0 as c0 ≤ s ≤ c1.
In the BIT mechanism,
bias2 = (λ(p1 − p2))2 ;
(E(s∗))2 = (s+ λ(p1 − p2))2 ; E(s∗2) = 2λ2 + s2 − 2(λ2−λc0)p1 − 2(λ2 + λc1)p2
MSE = 2λ2 + s2 − 2(λ2−λc0)p1 − 2(λ2 + λc1)p2 − (s+ λ(p1 − p2))2 + (λ(p1 − p2))2
= 2λ2(1− p1 − p2) + 2λ((c0 − s)p1 + (s− c1)p2)
= 2λ2 −2λ2p1 − 2λ2p2 + 2λ((c0 − s)p1 + (s− c1)p2)
< 2λ2 because each term in the boxed expression is < 0 as c0 ≤ s ≤ c1.
Since λ = δs/; if δs ∝ n−k (for k > 0), then MSE = O(λ2) = O(n−2k) for a given  in both the
truncated and BIT mechanisms.
C Proof of Proposition 5
The proof utilizes the following lemma.
Lemma A.1: If 1) an estimator θˆ is asymptotically unbiased for θ (E(θˆ) → θ as n → ∞), and
2) there exists a k ≥ 0 such that ∫− k < ∞ and |E(θˆ|θ)f(θ|β)| 5 k for all n, where f(θ|β) is a
probability density function, then E(E(θˆ|θ)|β)→ E(θ|β) as n→∞.
Proof: E(θˆ)→ θ as n→∞ and E(θˆ)f(θ|β)→ θf(θ|β) as n→∞. With condition 2) and Theorem
2 from Cunningham (1967), we have
∫
E(θˆ)f(θ|β)dθ → ∫ θf(θ|β)dθ = E(θ|β) as n→∞.
Part a): By the the law of total expectation, E(s∗|θ) = E[E(s∗|s)|θ]. Since E(s∗|s)→ s,
E[E(s∗|s)|θ]→E[s|θ] by Proposition A.1. Since E[s|θ]→ θ, then E(s∗|θ)]→ θ.
Part b): By the the law of total variance, V(s∗|θ) = V[E(s∗|s)|θ] + E[V(s∗|s)|θ]. Since s∗ p−→ s,
V(s∗|s) → 0 as n → 0. By Proposition A.1, E[V(s∗|s)|θ] → 0 as n → 0. Since s∗ p−→ s, then
E(s∗|s) → 0 as n → 0. By Proposition A.1, V[E(s∗|s)|θ] → 0 as n → 0. By part b), E(s∗|s) → s,
and E(s|θ)→ θ, then E(s∗|θ)→ θ as n→ 0. All taken together, s∗ p−→ θ.
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